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Abstract 
This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the 
first stage, parties run their primaries and in the second stage the winners of the primaries 
compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning 
candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all 
major theoretical predictions: the first stage expenditures and the total expenditures increase, 
while the second stage expenditures decrease in the carryover rate. Consistent with the theory, 
the total expenditures increase in the number of candidates and the number of parties. Contrary 
to the theory, however, expenditures in both stages of the competition exceed theoretical 
predictions. Disclosing information about the opponent’s expenditures in the first stage increases 
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1. Introduction 
Multi-stage contests are commonly characterized by the number of stages and the extent 
to which the expenditures in one stage affect the probability of winning in another stage. The US 
presidential race and many other political competitions fall into the category of multi-stage 
elimination contests. At each stage, candidates use self-promotion and campaign advertisement 
in order to advance to the final stage and win the election. Campaign advertising in earlier stages 
enhances the candidate’s image and thus increases the probability of winning the final stage of 
the election. Another prominent example of multi-stage elimination contests is the international 
competition for hosting the Olympic Games. In this contest, countries are eliminated at each 
stage and the resources expended by each country in earlier stages affect the probability of 
winning the competition in later stages. 
In this study, we are interested in the following questions: What is the effect of 
expenditure carryover on the behavior of contestants? How does information about the 
expenditures by the opponent affect behavior in different stages of the contest? To answer these 
questions we study a two-stage elimination contest between two political parties. In the first 
stage, parties run their primaries to select one candidate who proceeds to the final stage. The 
resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried 
over to the second stage. These expenditures carried over to the second stage may be interpreted 
as gaining name recognition or enhancing own image. In the second stage, the two finalists 
compete against each other in the general election. The winner of the second stage receives an 
“election prize”. 
Experimental results support all major predictions of the theory: the first stage 
expenditures and the total expenditures increase, while the second stage expenditures decrease in   3
the carryover rate. Consistent with the theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of 
candidates and the number of parties in the contest. Contrary to the theory, however, 
expenditures in both stages of the competition exceed theoretical predictions. Such high levels of 
expenditures can be explained by the fact that subjects have a non-monetary utility of winning 
(i.e., subjects are willing to pay money just to be winners). Most interestingly, we find that 
information about the expenditures of opponents in the first stage has an effect on expenditures 
of all candidates in both stages, which is not predicted by the theory. In particular, disclosing 
information about the opponent’s expenditures in the first stage increases the second stage 
expenditures and decreases the first stage expenditures of all candidates. Our findings suggest 
that the 1972 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), requiring all candidates to disclose their 
campaign expenditures, may have reduced socially wasteful expenditures. Our findings also 
speak in favor of the 1974 FECA Amendments that impose spending limits on expenditures in 
Presidential elections. 
To place our study into the context of previous literature, the following is a brief review 
of theoretical and experimental studies on contests. Major theories in contest literature are based 
on the seminal model of rent-seeking introduced by Tullock (1980). This model assumes that 
contests last for only one stage. However, in the real world, most political, economic and 
litigation contests last for multiple stages (Gradstein and Konrad 1999; Baik and Lee 2000; Stein 
and Rapoport 2005; Kaplan and Sela 2008).
1 In such multi-stage contests, contestants expend 
costly resources in each stage in order to advance to the final stage and win the prize. The 
expenditures made in earlier stages often affect the expenditures in latter stages. For example, in 
many political competitions, candidates who spend more money in early stages are often faced 
with budget constraints in the final stage of the competition (Parco, Rapoport and Amaldoss   4
2005). Stein and Rapoport (2005) formally introduce such budget constraints into a two-stage 
contest. They derive the conditions under which the budget constraint is binding and show how it 
may affect the expenditures in both stages. The expenditures made in earlier stages also may 
affect the outcomes in latter stages. For example, in the US presidential race, candidates 
enhancing their own image through advertising in the primary stage carry over the beneficial 
effects of their advertising to the general election. Such carryover comes in the form of name 
recognition, favorability, and committed supporters. Baik and Lee (2000) capture such 
environment by allowing the first stage expenditures to be carried over to the second stage. In 
their model, contestants from two groups compete in a two-stage contest to win a prize. In the 
first stage, each group selects a finalist who competes for the prize in the second stage. First-
stage expenditures are partially (or fully) carried over to the second stage. Baik and Lee (2000) 
demonstrate that the total expenditures increase in the carryover rate and they are equal to the 
value of the prize when the first stage expenditures are fully carried over to the second stage. 
Empirical studies of multi-stage contests are hard to conduct since it is difficult to 
measure individual abilities and expenditures without error (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990; 
Bognanno 2001). With this in mind, several researchers have turned to experimental tests of 
multi-stage contests in a laboratory setting. Parco, Rapoport and Amaldoss (2005) and Amaldoss 
and Rapoport (2009) report the results of experiments on two-stage contest with budget 
constraints. Their findings reject the equilibrium model of Stein and Rapoport (2005) because of 
significant over-expenditures in the first stage. Both experimental studies conjecture that the 
non-monetary value of winning plays a crucial role in explaining excessive over-expenditures in 
the first stage.
2 This experimental study builds on a game theoretical model of Baik and Lee 
(2000) to investigate the effects of carryover and information disclosure on the individual   5
behavior in two-stage political contests. In Section 2 we describe in details the theoretical model. 
Section 3 provides experimental design and testable hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results of 
the experiment and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
Consider a two-stage contest with a total of      players (candidates). In the first stage, 
all players are split evenly between   groups (parties) and each group consists of   players. 
Each player   chooses his expenditures level     to influence the probability     of winning the 
first stage. This probability is defined by a lottery contest success function: 
       ,       
   
∑    
 
   
.          ( 1 )  
The contestant’s probability of winning depends on his own expenditures relative to the 
total expenditures by all players. The winner in each group proceeds to the second stage. In the 
second stage,   players compete for a prize of value   (election prize). The probability that 
contestant   wins in the second stage is given by: 
       ,    ,     ,       
        
∑             
   
.          ( 2 )  
In addition to the second stage expenditures    , a fraction of the first stage expenditures 
    is carried over to the second stage. The carryover parameter    0,1  denotes the extent to 
which the first stage expenditures are carried over to the second stage. This parameter is the 
same for all players and is common knowledge. In terms of a political contest, one may interpret 
the expenditures carried over from the first stage as name recognition or enhanced image. A 
candidate who expends more resources on advertisement in the first stage receives better name 
recognition in the second stage, and thus has a higher chance of winning in the second stage.   6
To analyze the two-stage contest, we apply backward induction. In the second stage, the 
first stage expenditures are already determined. Therefore, the second stage expected payoff of a 
risk-neutral player  ,       , is derived by multiplying player  ‘s probability of winning the 
second stage,    , by prize value,  , minus the second stage expenditures,    . 
        
        
∑             
   
              ( 3 )  
Taking first order conditions with respect to     for all   1 ,…,   and solving them 
simultaneously we obtain 
                         
     
    ,    ,        ( 4 )  
From equations (4) and (2), the equilibrium probability of player   winning the second 
stage is given by      
 
 . Furthermore, the expected payoff in the second stage is         
 
          . We can now analyze the contest in the first stage between   players. Assuming 
each player   has correct expectations about the second stage expected payoff, the first stage 
expected payoff,       , can be derived by multiplying player  ’s probability of winning the first 
stage,     , by the expected payoff from the second stage,       , minus the first stage 
expenditures,    .  
        
   
∑    
 
   
 
 
                .        ( 5 )  
Taking first order conditions with respect to    , and assuming a symmetric pure strategy 
equilibrium, we obtain the first stage equilibrium expenditures level: 
  
   
 
  
     
          .           ( 6 )  
Combining (4) and (6), the equilibrium solution for the second stage expenditures is 
  
   
 
      
       
           .          ( 7 )    7
Formulas (6) and (7) demonstrate how the first and second stage expenditures depend on 
the prize value, the carryover rate, and the number of contestants in each stage. Simple 
comparative statics reveal that the first stage equilibrium expenditures   
  increase, while the 
second stage equilibrium expenditures   
  decrease in the carryover rate   (
   
 
    0  and 
   
 
    0 ).
3 
Next, we compute the total expenditures of the entire two-stage contest as the sum of all 
individual expenditures in the first and second stage: 
           
       
     
 
 
      
          .        ( 8 )  
The comparative statics of the model predict that the total expenditures    are increasing 
in the carryover rate   (
   
    0 ), number of groups   (
   
    0 ), and number of players   
(
   
    0 ). The general model described in this section can be viewed as a link between the 
models of Amegashie (1999) and Baik and Lee (2000). When placing the restriction   0 , the 
current model converges to the two-stage contest of Amegashie (1999). On the other hand, when 
  2  and   0 , the model converges to original contest of Baik and Lee (2000). 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
To test the theoretical predictions of our model, we design a laboratory experiment. 
Experiments are particularly useful in testing formal models of behavior, and in identifying 
conditions under which these models succeed or fail. For a review on political science 
experiments see Kinder and Palfrey (1993) and Morton and Williams (2008). The advantage of 
using a lab experiment is that it allows us to create an environment that precisely resembles the   8
theoretical model described in the previous section. Moreover, the lab experiment allows us to 
observe individual expenditures without error. 
Table 1: Experimental Design and Equilibrium Expenditures  
Treatment  Carryover 













N-FI 0  2  2  120  1 7.5  30 
2 30  60 
P-FI (P-NI)  0.5  2  2  120  1 12  48 
2 24  48 
F-FI (F-NI)  1  2  2  120  1 30  120 
2 0  0 
N-FI23 0  2  3  120  1 6.7  40 
2 30  60 
N-FI32 0  3  2  120  1 3.3  20 
2 26.7  80 
 
The outline of the experimental design and theoretical predictions for each treatment are 
shown in Table 1. Each treatment studies a two-stage contest with a different number of groups, 
i.e.   = 2 or   = 3, and with a different number of players per group, i.e.   = 2 or   = 3. The 
first stage winner of each group proceeds to the second stage and the winner of the second stage 
receives the prize. The financial incentive of   = 120 experimental francs (equivalent to $2) is 
used to induce the value of winning a political contest.  
In the no carryover treatment N-FI (“N” stands for no carryover and “FI” stand for full 
information), the first stage winner’s expenditures are not carried over to the second stage (  = 
0). In partial carryover treatments P-FI and P-NI (“P” stands for partial carryover and “NI” 
stand for no information), half of the first stage winner’s expenditures are carried over to the 
second stage (  = 0.5). In full carryover treatments F-FI and F-NI (“F” stands for full carryover), 
all first stage winner’s expenditures are carried over to the second stage (  = 1). The theoretical 
model generates several intuitive predictions. As the extent of carryover increases, the   9
expenditures made in the first stage increase and the expenditures made in the second stage 
decrease. From Table 1, the first stage expenditures increase from 7.5 to 12 and then to 30, and 
the second stage expenditures decrease from 30 to 24 and then to 0, as we move from   = 0 to   
= 0.5 and then to   = 1. Based on these predictions we formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. The first stage expenditures increase and the second stage expenditures 
decrease in the carryover rate. 
The logic behind this hypothesis is intuitive. The higher the extent of carryover, the more 
attractive it is for players to make higher expenditures in the first stage since players know that 
these expenditures will be carried over to the second stage. On the other hand, since all major 
expenditures are made in the first stage, there is no need for further expenditures in the second 
stage. Note that the total expenditures also depend on the carryover rate. According to the model, 
the total expenditures unambiguously increase in the carryover rate and they are equal to the 
value of the prize when   = 1. Table 1 shows that the total expenditures increase from 90 to 96 
and then to 120 as   increases from 0 to 0.5 and then to 1. 
Hypothesis 2. The total expenditures increase in the carryover rate. 
We also study two information conditions: full information and no information. In full 
information treatments P-FI and F-FI (“FI” stands for full information), subjects receive full 
information about the opponent’s expenditures carried over from the first stage. In no 
information treatments P-NI and F-NI (“NI” stands for no information), subjects receive no 
information about the opponent’s expenditures carried over from the first stage. If subjects 
behave according to the subgame perfect equilibrium, there should be no difference in 
expenditures between the two conditions.   10
Hypothesis 3. The information about the expenditures carried over by the opponent from 
the first stage does not affect individual behavior. 
Finally, we study the effect of number of groups and number of players per group on total 
expenditures in the two-stage political contests. For that reason, in treatment N-FI23, we hold the 
number of groups constant at   = 2 (as in N-FI treatment); however, we increase the number of 
players to   = 3. On the other hand, in treatment N-FI32, we hold the number of players constant 
at   = 2 (as in N-FI treatment), and increase the number of groups to   = 3. The prediction of 
the theory is that the total expenditures increase both in the number of groups and in the number 
of players per group. 
Hypothesis 4. The total expenditures increase in the number of groups and in the number 
of players per group. 
 
3.2. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment involved 132 undergraduate students. All students participated in only 
one session of this study. The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). We study seven treatments as in Table 1 in eleven sessions, with 12 subjects 
per each session. Each experimental session proceeded in several parts. Subjects were given 
instructions at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the instructions aloud (the 
instructions can be found online at this journal’s Web site). The wording in the instructions was 
written to induce a neutral environment. Before the actual experiment, subjects completed a quiz 
on the computer to verify their understanding of the instructions. The experiment started only 
after all subjects had answered all quiz questions. In the first part, subjects made 15 choices in 
simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002).
4 This method was used to elicit individual   11
subjects’ risk preferences. The consecutive parts of the experiment corresponded to different 
treatments described in Table 1.
5 Each treatment had 30 periods. In each period, subjects were 
randomly and anonymously placed either into a 2-player or a 3-player group (depending on the 
treatment). Subjects were randomly re-grouped after each period. At the beginning of each 
period, each subject received an endowment of 120 experimental francs.
6 Subjects could use 
their endowments to submit expenditures. After all subjects submitted their expenditures in the 
first stage, the computer then informed them if they were chosen to proceed to the second stage. 
The computer chose the winner of each group by implementing a simple lottery rule. The 
finalists of each group again submitted expenditures in the second stage. At the end of the second 
stage the computer chose the winner of the prize. 
In the final part of the experiment, subjects were given an endowment of 120 francs and 
were asked to submit expenditures in a one-stage contest for a prize value 0. Subjects were told 
that they would be informed whether they won the contest or not. We used this procedure to 
receive an indication of how important it is for subjects to win when winning is costly and there 
is no monetary reward for winning.
7 
 
4. Results of the Experiment 
Table 2 summarizes the average expenditures and average payoffs in treatments N-FI, P-
F(N)I and F-F(N)I. The striking feature of the data is that, in all two-stage contests, subjects 
exert significantly higher expenditures than the equilibrium prediction.
8 As a result, average 
payoffs are negative. This finding is consistent with previous experimental studies of Davis and 
Reilly (1998), Sheremeta (2010b) and Sheremeta and Zhang (2010). In all three studies, the total 
expenditures exceeded the prize value and subjects earned, on average, negative payoffs.   12
Result 1. Significant over-expenditures are observed in all contests. 
Table 2: Average Statistics for Treatments N-FI, P-F(N)I and F-F(N)I 
Treatment Stage Average Expenditures,    Total 
Expenditures
Average Payoff,   
Equilibrium  Actual     Equilibrium  Actual 
N-FI  1 
2 
7.5 13.0 (0.7) 132.4 7.5  -3.1  (2.2) 30 40.2 (1.7)
P-FI  1 12.0  18.2 (0.6) 148.2 6.0  -7.0  (1.2) 2 24.0  37.7 (0.9)
F-FI  1 30.0  21.0 (0.7) 152.5 0.0  -8.1  (1.1) 2 0.0  34.3 (1.1)
P-NI  1 12.0  22.0 (0.7) 153.1 6.0  -8.3  (1.2) 2 24.0  32.6 (0.9)
F-NI  1 30.0  33.4 (0.9) 171.6 0.0  -12.9  (1.2) 2 0.0  18.9 (0.9)
Standard error of the mean in parentheses.  
 
One possible explanation for such over-expenditures is that subjects may have a non-
monetary value for winning. In terms of a political competition, one may argue that, in addition 
to monetary incentives, candidates value winning itself and thus their overall value of the 
election prize is higher. In our experiment, we elicited a non-monetary value of winning. At the 
end of each session, all subjects were given 120 francs and were asked to submit expenditures 
for a prize value 0. We were surprised to discover that about 47% of subjects made positive 
expenditures: 25% of these subjects chose expenditures between 0.5 and 20, 10% chose between 
20.5 and 60, and 12% chose expenditures higher than 60 (60 francs is equivalent to $1). The 
average expenditure of subjects who chose to compete in a contest with no prize is 35.9 francs 
(equivalent to $0.6). This finding serves as a direct evidence of an earlier conjecture by Morton 
(1993) that subjects may “value winning the elections in spite of the monetary rewards of the 
experiment.” Moreover, we find that subjects who make higher expenditures in a contest with no 
prize, indicating higher non-monetary value of winning, also make higher expenditures in 
contests with a prize.
9 One may argue that such correlation can be explained by confusion; i.e.   13
subjects who make positive expenditures in a contest with no prize are confused, and thus they 
make irrationally high expenditures in contests with prize. There are two problems with such an 
argument. First, subjects participated in the contest with no prize at the very end of the 
experiment, after they played other contests for many periods. Second, before the actual 
experiment, subjects completed a quiz to verify their understanding of the contest game. 
Controlling for understanding of the contest, we still find significant correlation between 
expenditures for no prize and expenditures in contests with prize.
10 Therefore, this finding 
suggests that the non-monetary value of winning is a good explanation for significant over-
expenditures in contests.
11 It also highlights the importance of incorporating non-monetary 
incentives into models of political competition. 
Another point worth noting is the substantial variance in expenditures. Figures 1 and 2 
display the full distribution of the first and second stage expenditures in treatments PF(N)I and 
FF(N)I. Note that, instead of following a symmetric equilibrium, individual expenditures are 
distributed on the entire strategy space between 0 and 120. 
Result 2. There is substantial variance in individual expenditures. 
High variance in individual expenditures is consistent with previous experimental 
findings of the contest literature (Davis and Reilly 1998; Potters, De Vries and Van Linden 
1998). Several explanations have been offered. The first is that subjects make mistakes that cause 
some variance in expenditures. A second explanation is that subjects have different preferences 
towards risk which affect their behavior. In our experiment we elicited a measure of risk attitudes 
from a series of lotteries. We find substantial evidence that the measurement of risk attitude is a 
good predictor of subject’s behavior in a two-stage contest: more risk-averse subjects make lover 
expenditures than less risk-averse subjects.
12 Finally, it is also possible that the distribution of   14
expenditures reflects individual learning. Subjects may want to test different strategies and how 
these strategies affect the probability of winning. However, we do not find evidence for this 
explanation, since the variances of expenditures are very similar when comparing the first 15 
periods and the last 15 periods of the experiment.
13 
Figure 1: Distribution of Expenditures in Stage 1 for Treatments P-F(N)I and F-F(N)I 
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4.1. The Effect of Carryover 
It is well documented in political science that candidates often expend resources during 
the primaries in order to carry over the benefits to the general election (Glantz, Abramowitz and 
Burkart 1976). The unique feature of our experiment is that it captures the dynamic aspect of a 
political contest, allowing us to study the effect of carryover on the first and second stage 
expenditures. The equilibrium derived from the theoretical model predicts that, as the extent of 
carryover increases, the expenditures made in the first stage increase and the expenditures made 
in the second stage decrease. Table 2 shows that in N-FI treatment with no carryover the first 
stage expenditures are 13.0. These expenditures increase to 18.2 (22) in P-F(N)I treatment with 
partial carryover and they further increase to 21 (33.4) in F-F(N)I treatment with full carryover. 
This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1, indicating that the first stage expenditures increase 
in the carryover rate.
14 Table 2 also shows that in N-FI treatment the second stage expenditures 
are 40.2, and they decrease to 37.7 (32.6) in P-F(N)I treatment, and further decrease to 34.3 
(18.9) in F-F(N)I treatment. This finding is also consistent with Hypothesis 1, indicating that 
expenditures in the second stage decrease in the carryover rate.
15 
Result 3. The first stage expenditures increase while the second stage expenditures 
decrease in the carryover rate.  
Another theoretical prediction concerns the effect of carryover on the total expenditures. 
Theory predicts that the total expenditures should increase in the carryover rate. Table 2 
indicates that this theoretical prediction is supported. In the N-FI treatment the total expenditures 
are 132.4 and they increase to 148.2 in the P-FI treatment, and further increase to 152.2 in the F-
FI treatment. Similarly, in the P-NI treatment the total expenditures are 153.1 and they increases 
to 171.6 in the F-NI treatment. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
16   16
Result 4. The total expenditures increase in the carryover rate. 
In summary, general theoretical predictions with regard to the effect of carryover on the 
first stage expenditures, the second stage expenditures, and the total expenditures are supported 
by our experiment (Results 3 and 4). While qualitative predictions are supported by the data, the 
quantitative predictions of the theory are clearly rejected. This is mainly because of significant 
over-expenditures (Result 1) and substantial variation in individual behavior (Result 2). The 
potential application of these findings we discuss in the concluding Section 5. 
 
4.2. The Effect of Information Disclosure 
Often in political contests candidates are required to reveal the information about their 
campaign expenditures. However, it is not obvious how such policy affects the expenditures of 
individual candidates. One of the purposes of this study is to investigate how the information 
about the expenditures carried over by the opponent affects the behavior in the two-stage 
political contest. Our null hypothesis is that there should be no difference in the expenditures 
between  full information and no information conditions. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, Table 2 
reveals a strong difference in the aggregate behavior under the two information conditions. In 
particular, subjects expend less in the first stage and more in the second stage when they receive 
the information about the expenditures carried over by the opponents.
17 
Result 5. The first stage expenditures are higher under the no information condition and 
the second stage expenditures are higher under the full information condition. 
It is also interesting to note that the total expenditures (148.2 and 152.5) under the full 
information treatments P-FI and F-FI are lower than the total expenditures (153.1 and 171.6) 
under the no information treatments P-NI and F-NI.   17
Result 6. The total expenditures are lower under the full information. 
In summary, our findings suggest that the information about campaign expenditures 
affects a political contest in two important ways. First, information disclosure shifts the 
campaign expenditures from the first stage to the second stage. Second, it reduces the total 
expenditures of all candidates, thus increasing social welfare. 
 
4.3. The Effect of Number of Groups and Number of Players 
To investigate the effects of number of groups (parties) and number of players 
(candidates) per group we conducted additional treatments N-FI23 and N-FI32. The summary 
statistics of these two treatments and the NFI treatment is shown in Table 3. As predicted by the 
theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of groups  . In particular, when comparing 
treatments N-FI and N-FI23, as the number of groups increases from   = 2 to   = 3, the total 
expenditures increase from 132.4 to 176.7. Similarly, the total expenditures increase in the 
number of players per group: the expenditures of 132.4 in treatment N-FI (  = 2 and   = 2) 
increase to 179.7 in treatment N-FI32 (  = 3 and   = 2). These findings are consistent with 
Hypothesis 4. 
Result 7. Total expenditures increase in the number of groups and in the number of 
players per group. 
This intuitive result points out an important feature of political contests. As the total 
number of candidates increases, either through increase in the party size or through increase in 
the number of candidates per each party, the total expenditures increase. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that the increase in the number of parties has a different effect than the 
increase in the number of candidates per each party. In particular, higher number of candidates   18
per each party implies higher competition in the first stage, while higher number of parties 
implies higher competition in the second stage. In our experiment the total expenditures in the 
first stage are much higher in the N-FI23 treatment (112.2=18.7×6) than in the N-FI32 treatment 
(63=10.5×6). On the other hand, the total expenditures in the second stage are much lower in the 
N-FI23 treatment (67.8=33.9×2) than in the N-FI32 treatment (113.7=37.9×3). In summary, the 
intensity of political competition in the first and second stage crucially depends on the number of 
candidates in each party and the number of parties. Therefore, depending on the objective, one 
can re-structure the contest in order to maximize (or minimize) expenditures made in the first 
and second stage of the competition (Gradstein and Konrad, 1999; Moldovanu and Sela, 2006). 
Table 3: Average Statistics for Treatments N-FI, N-FI23, and N-FI32 
Treatment Stage Average Expenditures,    Total 
Expenditures
Average Payoff,   
Equilibrium  Actual     Equilibrium  Actual 
N-FI  1 
2 
7.5 13.0 (0.7) 132.4 7.5  -3.1  (2.2) 30 40.2 (1.7)
N-FI23  1 6.7  18.7 (1.0) 179.7 3.3  -8.4  (1.9) 2 30  33.9 (1.5)
N-FI32  1 3.3  10.5 (0.5) 176.7 3.3  -9.5  (2.1) 2 26.7  37.9 (1.3)
Standard error of the mean in parentheses.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The use of controlled experiments is a fruitful methodology in political science which has 
attracted the attention of many prominent scholars (Green and Gerber, 2003; Druckman, Green, 
Kuklinski and Lupia 2006; Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey 2007; Levine and Palfrey, 2007; 
Morton and Williams, 2008). The appeal of laboratory experiments is based on two major 
factors. First, laboratory experiments provide a great control over the experimental environment. 
Second, by randomly assigning human subjects to control and treatment groups, experiments   19
offer a unique opportunity to test a wide range of hypotheses about human behavior and how 
different policies affect such behavior. 
In this study we use a laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of expenditure 
carryover, information disclosure, number of candidates, and number of parties on the individual 
behavior in two-stage political contests. Experimental results support all major theoretical 
predictions: the first stage expenditures and the total expenditures increase in the carryover rate, 
and the second stage expenditures decreases in the carryover rate. Also, consistent with the 
theory, the total expenditures increase in the number of candidates and the number of parties in 
the contest. Disclosing information about the opponent’s carryover expenditures increases the 
second stage expenditures and decreases the first stage expenditures. Although the analogies 
between our laboratory experiment and naturally-occurring political contests are imperfect, we 
believe that our findings provide valuable insights. For example, we find that by manipulating 
the information and the extent of carryover rate, the designer can minimize socially wasteful 
expenditures in the first stage and encourage the winning candidates to incur all major 
expenditures in the second stage. The still widely debated 1972 FECA requires all candidates to 
disclose their campaign expenditures. Our findings suggest that such a policy shifts the campaign 
expenditures from the first stage to the second stage, reducing socially wasteful resource 
expenditures. 
The results of the experiment also indicate that expenditures are much higher than the 
equilibrium prediction. This finding is different from the findings of Parco, Rapoport and 
Amaldoss (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009), who find significant over-expenditures 
only in the first stage of a two-stage contest with budget constraints, and not in the second stage. 
The disparity between our findings and the two studies mentioned above implies that removing   20
the budget constraints results in wasteful over-expenditures. One policy implication of this 
finding is that the designer of a political contest should impose budget constraints on candidates’ 
expenditures in order to reduce wasteful over-expenditures. Such argument speaks in favor of the 
1974 FECA Amendments, which are designed to lower the cost of campaigning by setting limits 
on expenditures in Presidential elections. 
This study provides contributions to the literature on political spending (Levitt, 1994; 
Gerber, 1998), by explicitly investigating expenditures in different two-stage political contests. 
Also, the design of our experiment allows us to document that candidates have non-monetary 
values for winning. This finding contributes to the rapidly developing experimental literature 
trying to explain over-expenditures in rent-seeking contests (Davis and Reilly 1998; Potters, De 
Vries and Van Linden 1998; Amegashie, Cadsby and Song 2007; Sheremeta and Zhang 2010). 
Finally, the finding that theoretically irrelevant information may impact individual behavior in 
laboratory experiments is an important addition to the experimental political science literature.
18 
Besides empirical contributions, this study opens several avenues for future research. First, it is 
important to further investigate how individual behavior changes when the number of contestants 
is large, e.g. as in voting experiments of Levine and Palfrey (2007). Second, it would be 
interesting to conduct a field experiment using campaign professionals instead of undergraduate 
students. Future research should also consider other realistic extensions to multi-stage contests, 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Other theoretical studies of multi-stage elimination contests have been conducted by Rosen (1986), Gradstein 
(1998), and Amegashie (1999). All these studies investigate different aspects of multi-stage contests such as 
elimination procedures, interdependency between the stages, and asymmetry between contestants. 
2 Other experimental studies of multi-stage contests are done by Schmitt, Shupp, Swope and Cadigan (2004), 
Amegashie, Cadsby and Song (2007), and Sheremeta (2010b). 
3 Other comparative statics reveal that, as the number of players   in each group increases, the expenditures in the 
first stage decrease and the expenditures in the second stage increase (
   
 
    0  and 
   
 
    0 ). Also, as the number of 
groups   increases, the expenditures in the first stage   
  decrease (
   
 
    0 ). The expenditures in the second stage 
can either increase or decrease in  , depending on   and  . However, when   0 , the second stage expenditures 
unambiguously decrease in the number of groups  . 
4 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff 
with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across 
all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of winning $3 and a 95% chance of winning $0, while the last 
lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. 
5 Treatments P-FI (F-FI) and P-NI (F-NI) were ran during eight sessions using switching order design, i.e. AB and 
BA. Treatments N-FI, N-FI23 and N-FI32 were ran separately during the three other sessions. 
6 The endowment of 120 francs was chosen for several reasons. First, the endowment was chosen to be equal to the 
prize value. Second, the endowment was also chosen to be substantially higher than the Nash equilibrium 
predictions in order to make sure that in the second stage subjects are not budget constrained.  
7 The procedure for the final part of the experiment closely followed Sheremeta (2010b). At the end of the 
experiment, 1 out of 15 decisions subjects made in part one was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were also 
paid for 5 out of 30 periods in each treatment. The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 60 francs to 
$1. On average, subjects earned $25 each which was paid in cash. Each experimental session lasted about 90 
minutes. 
8 To support this conclusion we estimated a simple panel regression for each treatment, where the dependent 
variable is expenditures and independent variable is constant. The model included a random effects error structure, 
with the individual subject as the random effect, to account for the multiple decisions made by individual subjects. 
The model also used clustered standard errors at the session level to account for session effects. Based on a standard 
Wald test, conducted on estimates of a model, we found that for all treatments the constant coefficients are 
significantly higher than the predicted theoretical values in Table 4.1 (p-value < 0.05).  
9 We estimated a random effects model where the dependent variable is the expenditures and the independent 
variables are a period trend, treatment and session dummy-variables, and non-monetary expenditures. The results of 
the estimation indicate a very significant and positive correlation between the expenditures in contests with prize 
and the expenditures in a contest with no prize.  
10 The number of correct quiz answers is a good control variable for confusion. Indeed, we find that subjects who 
understand the instructions better (higher number of correct quiz answers) make lower expenditures in contests with 
(and without) a prize. Nevertheless, even if we control for this confusion, we still find positive and very significant 
correlation between expenditures for no prize and expenditures in contests with a prize. This finding suggests that 
winning is a component in a subject’s utility and that higher non-monetary utility of winning causes higher over-
expenditures in contests. 
11 The conjecture that subjects have non-monetary value of winning has been used by many studies to explain over-
expenditures in contests, including Schmitt, Shupp, Swope and Cadigan (2004), Parco, Rapoport and Amaldoss 
(2005), Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009). In contrast, the current study presents direct evidence that subjects are 
willing to pay money just to be winners. 
12 We estimate several random effects models where the dependent variable is the expenditures and the independent 
variables are the measurements of risk-aversion, session, and treatment dummy-variables. All specifications indicate 
that risk attitudes elicited from lotteries have significant influence on the expenditures. 
13 A standard F-test for the equality of variances cannot reject the hypothesis that expenditures have the same 
variance in the first 15 periods as in the last 15 periods of the experiment (p-value > 0.1). 
14 We estimated random effect models separately for each information condition (FI and NI), with expenditures as 
the dependent variable and treatment dummy as the independent variable. In both conditions the dummy-variable is   24
                                                                                                                                                             
significant (p-value < 0.05). When clustering standard errors at the session level, the difference is significant only 
for the last 15 periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.05). 
15 The differences are statistically significant based on the estimation of random effect models (p-value < 0.05). 
When clustering standard errors at the session level, the difference is significant only for the last 15 periods of the 
experiment (p-value < 0.05). 
16 Because of high variance in individual expenditures, the differences are not significant. 
17 The first stage expenditures (22.0 and 33.4) under the no information treatments P-FI and F-FI are higher than the 
expenditures (18.2 and 21.0) under the full information treatments P-NI and F-NI. The difference is statistically 
significant only when comparing F-FI and F-NI treatments. Similarly, the second stage expenditures (32.6 and 18.9) 
under the no information treatments are lower than the expenditures (37.7 and 34.3) under the full information 
treatments. 
18 It has been long recognized in economics literature that theoretically irrelevant information may have impact on 
individual behavior in the laboratory experiments. Smith (1991) found that in continuous double auction under 
private information convergence to the Nash equilibrium is faster than under complete information. The argument 
that private information can yield more equilibrium-consistent results has also been established in the Nash 
bargaining games (Roth 1987). 
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